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Jean  Tir?le,  University  of Toulouse  and  MIT 
Executive  Summary 
The  past  two  decades  have  seen  an  explosion  of  patent  awards  and  litigation 
across  a wide  variety  of  technologies,  which  numerous  commentators  have  sug 
gested  has  socially  detrimental  consequences.  Patent  pools,  in  which  owners  of 
intellectual  property  share patent  rights with  each  other  and  third parties,  have 
been  proposed  as  a way  in  which  firms  can  address  this patent-thicket  problem. 
The  paper  discusses  the current  regulatory  treatment  of patent  pools  and  high 
lights why  a  more  nuanced  view  than  focusing  on  the extreme  cases  of perfect 
complements  and perfect  substitutes  is needed.  It also highlights  the importance 
of regulators'  stance  toward  independent  licensing,  grantback  policies,  and  roy 
alty  control.  We  also  present  case-study  and  large-sample  empirical  evidence. 
I.  Introduction 
The  past  two  decades  have  seen  an  explosion  of  patent  awards  across  a 
wide  variety  of  technologies  and  a dramatic  increase  in  the  volume  of 
patent  litigation  between  rivals.  Numerous  commentators  have  sug 
gested  that  the  proliferation  of  these  awards  has  socially  detrimental 
consequences:  overlapping  intellectual  property  rights  make  it expen 
sive  for  final  good  producers  to commercialize  innovative  products  and 
difficult  for  inventors  to  move  the  technological  frontier.1 
Patent  pools, which  can  be  defined  as  formal  or  informal  organizations 
where  owners  of  intellectual  property  share  patent  rights  with  each  other 
and  third  parties,  have  been  proposed  as  a way  in which  firms  can  ad 
dress  this  patent-thicket  problem.2  Indeed,  patent  pools  are  already  an  eco 
nomically  significant  institution:  a  recent  estimate  suggests  that  sales  in 
2001  of  devices  based  in  whole  or  in part  on  pooled  patents  were  at  least 
$100  billion.3  Were  these  suggestions  to be  adopted,  their  role might  ap 
proach  that  seen  in  the  early  days  of  the  twentieth  century,  when  many 158  Lerner  and Tir?le 
(if not most)  important  manufacturing  industries  had  a patent  pooling 
arrangement. 
While  the  patent  pools  have  been  well  established  in basic  manufac 
turing  and  electronic  industries  for  decades,  they  have  been  increas 
ingly  seen  as  a potential  solution  for prevalent  patent  licensing  issues  in 
biotechnology-related  fields.4  Indeed,  in the past  few  years,  the biom?d 
ical research  community  has  expressed  a keen  interest  in the development 
of  patent  pools  for biomarkers  for  cancer,  patents  relative  to HIV/AIDS 
and  SARS,  as well  as  for biotechnologies  applied  to agriculture  and  an 
imal  cloning.  Similarly,  the Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (2002)  highlighted  the development  of  biom?dical  patent 
pools  as  an  area  for  future  research. 
Public  policy  toward  patent  pools  gradually  shifted  from  an  extreme 
laissez-faire  approach  in  the  early  twentieth  century  to an  outright  hos 
tility  in the middle  of  the  century.5  Only  in  the  late  1990s  have  pools  been 
examined  in a  more  favorable  light  by  regulators.  While  patent  pools  are 
no  longer  frowned  upon  by  competition  authorities  and  treated  as  a col 
lusive  agreement  among  potential  competitors,  they  still  raise  a num 
ber  of  concerns  that  optimally  should  be  addressed  in order  to build  a 
stronger  support  in their  favor  and  to secure  their  adoption  in the  future. 
This  paper  aims  at  pointing  out  what  we  know  and  don't  know  about 
patent  pools,  their  general  desirability,  and  the  types  of  covenants  that 
should  or  should  not  be  included  into  their  charters. 
The  paper  is organized  as  follows.  Section  II discusses  the  current  reg 
ulatory  treatment  of  patent  pools.  Section  III introduces  the basic  trade 
off  between  royalty  stacking  and  suppression  of  competition  by  looking 
at  the  extreme  cases  of  perfect  complements  and  perfect  substitutes.  It 
also  argues  that  these  two  polar  cases  are  of  limited  use  to understand 
the main  regulatory  challenges  raised  by  the  competition  authorities' 
limited  information  about  the  extent  of  substitutability  or  complemen 
tarity  of  patents  included  in the pool.  The  section  also  highlights  the  im 
portance  of  regulators'  stance  toward  independent  licensing  (the  indi 
vidual  patent  holders'  ability  to  license  their  property  independently  of 
the  pool),  grant-back  policies  (a requirement  by  the pool  that members 
turn  their  future  intellectual  property  to  the pool  if the  latter  is deemed 
essential  to  a proper  working  of  the  technology  covered  by  the  pool), 
and  royalty  control. 
Sections  IV and  V  discuss  the  social  desirability  of  independent  licens 
ing  and  grant-backs,  respectively.  Section  IV  shows  that  independent 
licensing  goes  a  long  way  toward  addressing  the  concerns  associated Public  Policy  toward  Patent  Pools  159 
with  the  lack  of  information  as  to whether  a pool  is about  suppressing 
royalty  stacking  or  competition.  It discusses  whether  pools  that  allow  in 
dependent  licensing  raise  social  welfare  either  ex post  (price  reduction) 
or  from  an  ex  ante,  Schumpeterian  perspective  in which  innovation  is 
endogenous.  Section  V  discusses  the pros  and  cons  of grant-back  policies. 
Section  VI  presents  the  empirical  evidence  on  these  two  dimensions 
of pool  design.  It discusses  an  analysis  of  sixty-three  patent  pools.  While 
this work  cannot  directly  test  propositions  about  social  welfare,  the  evi 
dence  largely  corroborates  the key  claims  about  the  considerations  driv 
ing  the  formation  and  structuring  of patent  pools. 
Section  VII  presents  theoretical  considerations  as well  as  empirical  re 
sults  on when  we  expect  patent  holders  to be willing  to  jump  on  board 
and  form  a pool.  Some  of  the  open  issues  are  illustrated  in section  VIII  in 
a mini-case  study  about  the Motion  Picture  Experts  Group  (MPEQ-2 
pool.  Finally,  section  IX  lists  and  discusses  a  few  open  issues  regarding 
pools.  The  appendix  contains  the  technical  analysis. 
II.  Current  Regulatory  Treatment 
The  recent  evolution  has  been  shaped  by  the  regulatory  turnaround  ini 
tiated  by  the U.S.  Department  of  Justice  (DOJ) business  review  letters  of 
the  late  1990s  and  the  even  more  recent  guidelines  of  the  European 
Commission  (April  2004)  and  of  the  Japanese  Fair  Trade  Commission 
(2005).  In  this  section,  we  present  a  simplified  summary  of  the U.S.  and 
European  policies. 
Before  doing  so,  it  is worth  highlighting  the  fundamental  tension  in 
regulators'  views  of  antitrust  activities.  Many  observers  have  suggested 
that  patent-thicket  problems?where  key  patents  are widely  held?af 
fect many  emerging  industries.  Patent  thickets  may  lead  to  three  prob 
lems.  First,  royalty  stacking  may  result:  each  individual  patent  holder 
may  charge  a  royalty  that  seems  reasonable  when  viewed  in  isolation, 
but  together  they  represent  an  unreasonable  burden.  Second,  even  if 
other  firms  agree  to  license  their  patents  at  a modest  rate,  a hold-out 
problem  may  result  if a single  firm  then  sets  a high  license  fee  for  its  tech 
nology  Finally,  the  very  process  of  arranging  the  needed  licenses  may 
prove  to be  time  consuming.  Patent  pools  thus  offer  a  one-stop  shop 
through  which  these  problems  can  be  avoided. 
But  as  alluded  to  in  the preceding  section,  patent  pools  can  also  have  a 
darker  side.  By  the  1890s,  pooling  agreements  had  become  commonplace 
in the United  States.  Interest  in patent  pools  stemmed  in large part  from  the 160  Lerner  and Tir?le 
desire  to  avoid  the  restrictions  on  anticompetitive  activities  that  had 
been  enacted  as part  of  the  Sherman  Act  of  1890.  Patent  pools  were  seen 
as  exempt  from  regulatory  scrutiny,  a perception  that was  buttressed  in 
the  1902 National  Harrow  case,  when  the U.S.  Supreme  Court  refused  to 
invalidate  a patent  pool  despite  the  apparent  use  of  the pool  by  its  mem 
bers  to fix  prices  and  reduce  competition. 
U.S.  Department  of  Justice 
As  a  consequence  of  the  vigorous  scrutiny  of  patent  pools  in  the New 
Deal  and  ensuing  years,  the  number  of  new  patent  pools  formed  in  the 
United  States  dwindled  away  to  almost  nothing  after World  War  II. In 
recent  years,  however,  there  has  been  a  cautious  revival.  In  1995,  the 
DOJ  and  U.S.  Federal  Trade  Commission  issued  the  "Antitrust  Guide 
lines  for  the  Licensing  of  Intellectual  Property,"  which  explicitly  noted, 
"cross-licensing  and  pooling  arrangements  may  provide  pro-competitive 
benefits."6  Shortly  thereafter,  DOJ's  Antitrust  Division  issued  a  favor 
able  review  letter  concerning  the  MPEG-2  video  patent  pool.  The  result 
has  been  a modest  resurgence  of  these  arrangements.  Numerous  steps 
have  been  taken  by  the  designers  of  these  pools  to avoid  antitrust  scru 
tiny,  including,  in  many  cases,  the  submission  of  the pooling  agreement 
to  the Antitrust  Division  for  advance  approval. 
An  initial  requirement  of  the DOJ's  recent  reviews  of  patent  pools  is 
that  the pool's  charter  not  include  any  ancillary  restraints.  This  is easily 
understood.  The  creation  of  a pool  should  not  be  a front  for an  organized 
division  of markets  or  other  cartelization  strategies. 
The  DOJ  then  requires  that  the  pool  contain  only  "essential  patents": 
that  is,  those  which  are  necessary  to  implement  the  technology.  One  im 
plication  is  that  patents  within  the pool  should  not  be  substitutes  (inter 
nal  test). A  patent  in  the pool  should  also  have  no  substitute  outside  the 
pool  (external  test).  By  contrast,  before  1995,  there were  almost  no  pro 
visions  relative  to  the  inclusion  of  essential  patents  in pools. 
Pool  members  should  retain  the  right  to  license  their  property  sepa 
rately  (independent  licensing).  Finally,  the DOJ  monitors  royalty  rates 
and  grant-back  provisions.  For  instance,  while  not  explicitly  prohibited 
anymore?among  the  famous  "nine  no-nos"  that  presaged  antitrust  en 
forcement  in  the  1970s  was  a prohibition  against  "compulsory  assign 
ment  of  grantbacks"  (Wilson  1970)?there  is  at  least  some  degree  of 
skepticism  surrounding  grant-backs,  in  light  of  the possibility  that  they 
will  be  expanded  to  encompass  nonessential  patents.  When  reviewing 
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The  grant-back  here,  as  in other  arrangements  previously  reviewed,  is limited  to 
essential  patents.  By precluding  licensors  from using  the evaluation  services  or 
obtaining  standardized  licenses while  holding  back  their own  patents,  it  makes 
the portfolio  of patents  available  through  the PlatformCo's  licensing  terms more 
comprehensive  and  potentially  lowers  transactions  costs  to  other  licensees.  In  ad 
dition,  the  assurance  that  the  grant-back  obligation  here  will  not  extend  to  other 
PlatformCos  with  potentially  competing  technologies  provides  an  important 
guarantee  against  overbreadth.  We  also understand  that a holder  of  3G patents 
can  avoid  participation  in any  of  the Platform  arrangements  by  not  accepting 
any  licenses  it needs  in the form of Standard  or  Interim  licenses,  instead  negoti 
ating  separately 
on  a bilateral  basis  with  licensors  that  are  Platform  members.7 
European  Commission 
The  European  Commission  shares  the DOJ's  concerns  about  situations 
when  patents  that  are  substitutes  are  included  in the pools,  as well  as  the 
inclusion  of  nonessential  (and  particularly  invalid)  patents  in  these  ar 
rangements.8  They  also  encourage  allowing  firms  to  license  patents  in 
dependently  of  the pool. 
The  formal  European  policies  are  somewhat  more  explicit  than  broad 
U.S.  antitrust  guidelines  on  pools  in  several  respects.9  In particular,  the 
European  policies  explicitly  address  a broader  set  of  points  regarding 
the  structure  of  these  pools: 
The  use  of  an  independent  expert  to determine  whether  patents  are  es 
sential  is  strongly  encouraged  (an  approach  that  has  been  followed  by 
recent  pools  everywhere). 
The  presence  of  a  formal  dispute  resolution  mechanism  is embraced.10 
The  Commission  strongly  encourages  pools  to make  the  technology 
available  in a nondiscriminatory  manner  and  on  reasonable  terms. 
Grant-back  requirements  should  be  limited  to  truly  essential  patents. 
Menus  are  encouraged,  so users  do  not  need  to purchase  licenses  to 
patents  that  they  don't  need.11 
III.  Royalty  Stacking  or  Suppression  of  Competition? 
Cournot  and  Bertrand 
In  some  respects  the  analysis  of  pools  follows  the  standard  regulatory 
treatment  of  horizontal  and  vertical  mergers. 
Suppose,  first,  that  a  technology  is covered  by  n patents,  which  for ex 
positional  simplicity  only,  are  owned  by  n distinct  patent  holders.  The 162  Lerner  and  Tir?le 
patents  are  perfect  complements  when  a user  who  does  not  have  access  to 
one  of  them  is unable  to  make  use  of  the  technology;  put  differently,  a  li 
cense  to even  n -1  patents  is equivalent  to having  no  license  at  all. 
With  perfectly  complementary  patents,  a user  of  the  technology  re 
sembles  a shipping  company  trying  to  move  wares  on  a barge  from A  to 
B  along  a  river  or  a canal  controlled  in successive  locations  by  n distinct 
tax  collectors.  As  Cournot  (1838)  and  Shapiro  (2001)  have  pointed  out, 
users  are  then  confronted  with  multiple  taxations  (marginalizations)  or, 
in  the  context  of  innovation,  royalty  stacking.  The  resulting  price  for  the 
technology  then  exceeds  the  total  price  (the pool  price)  that patent  hold 
ers would  jointly  set  if they  coordinated  their  pricing.  Intuitively  in  this 
chain  of monopolies,  each  patent  holder  has  gatekeeping  power  over  the 
technology.  When  he  raises  his  price  slightly,  he  does  not  internalize  the 
negative  impact  of  this  increase  on  other  patent  holders,  who  see mar 
ginal  users  abandon  the  technology  altogether.  As  a result,  cartel  pricing 
increases  both  profit  and  user  welfare  under  perfect  complements.  Put 
differently,  a pool  eliminates  royalty  stacking  and  benefits  both  patent 
holders  and  technology  users. 
Contrast  this with  the  case  of perfect  substitutes,  that  is, of patents  that are 
distinct  and  noninfringing,  but  deliver  the  same  functionality  to the users. 
In  the  absence  of  pools,  cutthroat  (Bertrand)  competition  among  intel 
lectual  property  (IP) owners  results  in  little  or  no  profit.  In  the  absence 
of  licensing  costs,  licenses  are basically  free  of  charge  because  undercut 
ting would  be  too  tempting  if they were  not.  Here,  a pool  is but  a  merger 
into  a  monopolistic  arrangement  and  allows  patent  holders  to suppress 
competition.  Thus,  pools  of  perfect  substitutes  should  be  banned. 
Reality  Is  in Between 
Cournot's  royalty-stacking  argument,  on  which  the  case  for  pools  is 
built,  relies  on  perfect  or  close  to perfect  complementarity.  In practice, 
though,  patents  are  rarely  perfect  complements.  Additional  licenses 
to  one's  portfolio  increase  the  number  of  feasible  functionalities  and 
thereby  the  number  of  applications  that  build  on  the  technology  with 
out  being  strictly  necessary  (indeed,  this  is the  idea  behind  the European 
Commission's  recommendation  that pools  offer menus,  rather  than  only 
the  entire  package).  Furthermore,  users  may  often  (at  a  cost)  "design 
around"  existing  patents  to enable  similar  functionalities. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  and  even  though  they  rely  on  experts  to determine 
whether  patents  are  essential,  competition  authorities  are  often  unsure Public  Policy  toward  Patent  Pools  163 
as  to whether  patents  are  substitutes  or  complements.  Patent  holders 
themselves  may  not  perfectly  anticipate  the dependence  relationship.  A 
case  in point  is  that  of  the MPEG-2  patent  pool  discussed  later  on,  in 
which  Lucent  refused  to  include  two  patents  deemed  essential  and  later 
made  far  less money  licensing  than  initially  anticipated. 
Furthermore,  the distinction  between  substitutes  and  complements  is 
a dynamic  one.  First  patents  covering  a  technology  to be  adopted  by 
users  often  are  complements  at  low  prices  and  substitutes  at  higher 
prices.  At  low  individual-license  prices,  users  who  choose  to adopt  the 
technology  find  it advantageous  to opt  for an  all-inclusive  license.  When 
an  owner  raises  his  price  slightly,  he  reduces  the demand  for  the  overall 
technology  and  thereby  the  demand  for  the  other  owners'  licenses.  By 
contrast,  at high  prices,  an  increase  in a  license  price  induces  technology 
users  to  focus  on  other  patents,  that  is,  to  evict  the  patent  from  their  li 
censing  basket. 
Second,  the  extent  of  substitutability  or  complementarity  may  evolve 
over  time.  For  example,  two  patents  may  be  jointly  needed  to produce 
functionality  A,  which  is demanded  today;  but  both  enable  on  a  stand 
alone  basis  functionality  B, which  will  be  demanded  tomorrow.  In such 
a  case,  the patents  are  complements  today  and  substitutes  tomorrow. 
Another  drawback  of  the  two  polar  cases  is that  they  are  of  limited  use 
for  an  analysis  of most  policy  questions.  Pools  of  perfect  complements 
raise welfare,  and  those  with  perfect  substitutes  lower  it. To  be  sure,  in 
dependent  licensing  recreates  cutthroat  competition  in  the  case  of  per 
fect  substitutes.  But  one  can  alternatively  ban  the  pool.  Independent 
licensing  is  irrelevant  in  the  case  of perfect  complements;  intuitively,  in 
dependent  licensing  can  be  effective  only  if users  buy  all  individual  li 
censes,  instead  of  buying  them  as  a bundle  from  the  pool.  But  royalty 
stacking  then  leads  to a price  above  the pool's  profit  maximizing  price, 
and  so  the  pool  is unaffected  by  the members'  ability  to grant  separate 
licenses.  Somehow,  for  independent  licensing  to be  a  relevant  question, 
there must  be  some  imperfect  substitutability  or  complementarity  Sim 
ilarly,  it is difficult  to  make  sense  of  the DOJ's  internal  and  external  tests 
in a world  of  perfect  complements  or  perfect  substitutes. 
IV.  Independent  Licensing 
The  licensors'  ability  to  license  their  intellectual  property  independently 
of  the pool  creates  some  potential  competition  for  the pool's  offering.  In 
dependent  licensing  (IL), however,  raises  two  related  questions: 164  Lerner  and Tir?le 
Impact  on  the incentives  to form  a pool  and  on price moderation:  One  concern  is 
that  an  IL  requirement  imposed  by  competition  authorities  might  dis 
courage  IP owners  to  form  a pool  that would  otherwise  have  been  benefi 
cial. Conversely,  it  may  be  the  case  that  the  IL requirement  not  be  sufficient 
to screen  out  or  sufficiently  constrain  pools  that  suppress  competition. 
Impact  on  the  incentives  to  innovate:  Besides  the  ex  post  perspective  of 
looking  at whether  the  pool  reduces  price  (a  central  focus  in merger 
analysis),  one  may  also  (more  in  the  tradition  of  patent  law)  take  an  ex 
ante  or  Schumpeterian  perspective  and  consider  the  impact  of  allowing 
pools  (with  or without  an  IL requirement)  on  the  inventors'  incentives  to 
innovate. 
To provide  an  analysis  of  these  two  key  questions,  we  developed  in an 
earlier  paper  (Lerner  and  Tir?le  2004)  an  analytical  framework  that  is 
simple  enough  to be  tractable  and  yet  rich  enough  to allow  for  the gamut 
between  perfect  substitutes  and  perfect  complements.  This  framework 
is discussed  in appendix  A. 
A  striking  result  emerges  from  this  framework:  independent  licensing 
perfectly  screens  out  good  pools  in and  bad  pools: 
1.  Independent  licensing  is an  irrelevant  covenant  when  the pool  aims 
at  lowering  the  overall  price  of  the  technology  below  the price  that  pre 
vails  in  the  absence  of  pooling  arrangement  (royalty  stacking). 
2.  Independent  licensing  restores  competition  and  reestablishes  the 
price  of  the  technology  at  the  prepool  level  when  the pool  aims  at  rais 
ing  the price  of  the  technology  (suppression  of  competition). 
The  intuition  for  this  result  is particularly  easy  to grasp  in the  case  of  two 
owners/two  patents.  Let  zf stand  for patent  z's  marginal  contribution  to 
user  surplus;  for example,  z2 represents  the  extra  surplus  that  a user  de 
rives  from  acquiring  a  license  to patent  2 when  having  already  secured 
a  license  to patent  l.12 
In  the  absence  of a pool,  patent  holders  cannot  charge  more  than  their 
marginal  contributions;  otherwise,  users  would  do without  it. They  can, 
of  course,  charge  less  than  this marginal  contribution  if  they  feel  that  a 
price  reduction  is  more  than  offset  by  a  strong  increase  in demand  for 
the  overall  technology.  We  are  thus  led  to consider  two  situations.  In  the 
first,  at  least  one  patent  holder,  say  owner  1, charges  strictly  less  than  his 
marginal  contribution  (this  is  in particular  the  case  if one  of  the patents 
is blocking  because  the  owner  of  such  a  patent  is never  worried  that Public  Policy  toward  Patent  Pools  165 
users  adopt  the  technology,  but  do  not  acquire  a  license  to his  patent).  In 
a  generalization  of  the  royalty-stacking  argument,  and  using  the  idea 
that  each  owner  is a  monopolist  on  his  residual  demand  curve,  it is easy 
to  see  that  the  overall  price  of  the  technology  then  exceeds  the  one  that 
would  prevail  if the  two  owners  formed  a pool  and  thereby  coordinated 
their  pricing:  owner  1  is de  facto  a monopolist  choosing  a price  P  for 
the  overall  technology  and  facing  marginal  cost  p2  (the price  charged  by 
owner  2  for  a  license),  that  is,  the  compensation  that  is  to be  returned  to 
owner  2. That  is, one  can  consider  the fictitious,  but  economically  equiv 
alent  situation  in  which  owner  1 pays  owner  2 p2 for  the  license  of patent 
2 and  sells  the bundle  of  the  two  licenses  to  the users.  By  contrast,  a pool 
chooses  a price  P*  for  the overall  technology  but  has marginal  cost  0 < p2. 
Because  monopoly  prices  always  increase  with  marginal  cost,  a pool 
lowers  price  relative  to  separate  licensing  (P* < P). 
The  interesting  case  arises  when  in  the  absence  of  a pool,  each  owner 
i charges  his marginal  contributionzf.  Either  z1 +  z2>  P*,  and  again  the 
pool  lowers  the price  of  the  technology,  or  z^ +  z2<  P*,  and  then  the pool 
suppresses  competition  in  the  absence  of  independent  licensing. 
Let  us  now  allow  independent  licensing  and  ask when  the price  P  (which 
may  or may  not  be  equal  to  the  price  P*  that  emerges  in  the  absence  of 
IL)  is  chosen  by  the  pool  immune  to undercutting  by  an  individual  li 
censor.  Owner  i can  offer  the  same  net  surplus  to users  as  the pool  by  of 
fering  his  license  at price  P  -  z..  If the  pool  royalties  p. going  to owner  j 
(who  owns  share  p./P  in  the  pool)  exceed  z-,  then  it  is  indeed  in  the  in 
terest  of  owner  / to undercut  the  pool. 
Sustainable  pool  royalties  under  IL  must  therefore  satisfy 
which,  together  with  px +  p2 
= P,  implies  that 
P<z^ 
+  z2. 
Conversely,  for any  pool  price  P  exceeding  the  sum  of  the  contributions, 
that  is,  the price  of  the  technology  without  a pool,  and  regardless  of  the 
division  of  the pool's  royalties  between  the  two  IP owners,  the pool  will 
be  undercut  under  IL. The  undercutting  implies  that  IP owners  end  up 
marketing  their  property  as  if  the  pool  did  not  exist. We  conclude  that 
the pool  cannot  charge  a price  above  the  competitive  level.13 
As  we  noted,  competition  authorities  have  little  information  as  to 
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applications  or  are  likely  to  remain  so.  Fortunately,  the  screening  prop 
erty  of  independent  licensing  makes  it completely  unnecessary  for  au 
thorities  to  possess  such  information.  This  result  is  reassuring  as we 
have  limited  trust  in  interventions  whose  suitability  depends  finely  on 
information  that  competition  authorities  do  not  possess. 
The  Ex Ante  View.  We  saw  that  pools  with  IL always  (weakly)  lower 
price  and  increase  welfare  from  an  ex post  perspective.  But  the possibil 
ity of  forming  a pool  also  affects  the firms'  incentive  to  innovate.  The  op 
tion  to  form  a pool  augments  ex post  profits.14 
On  the other  hand,  we  also  know  that  incentives  to  innovate,  while  of 
ten  too  low, may  also  be  too high  from  a social  perspective.  Consider  "in 
novation  for  buyout,"  in which  an  inventor  deliberately  produces  a 
(noninfringing)  innovation  with  the  exact  same  functionalities  as  an  ex 
isting  patent.15  Such  a me-too  innovation  is  socially  wasteful  but  may 
nonetheless  be  pursued  if the  inventor  knows  that his  innovation  will  be 
purchased  by  its  rival;  furthermore,  a pool  may  be  the  vehicle  through 
which  this  blackmail  pays  off.  On  the  other  hand,  such  innovations  for 
buyout  do  not  arise  if  IL  is mandated,  as  the  formation  of  a pool  then 
does  not  deliver  any  profit. 
A  possible  conjecture  is,  therefore,  that  pools  with  IL are  always  prefer 
able  to no pool from  an  ex ante,  and  not  only  from  an  ex post,  perspective.  This 
conjecture,  which  was  not  proved  in our  2004  paper,  turns  out  to be  cor 
rect:  see  appendix  B. Overall,  these  results  build  a  strong  case  for pools 
as  long  as  an  IL requirement  is appended. 
Discussion.  In Lerner  and  Tir?le  (2008),  we  study  the  impact  of  inde 
pendent  licensing  in broader  contexts.  Independent  licensing  does  not 
always  weed  out  bad  pools.  The  reason  why  is as  follows.  Suppose,  first, 
that users  differ  not  only  in  their  overall  valuation  for  or  costs  of  imple 
menting  the  technology,  but  also  in  which  patents  they  care  about  (note 
that  this  alone  implies  that  patents  are  not  essential).  For  example,  some 
users  want  licenses  to both  patents  1 and  2, while  others  care  only  about 
patent  1 or  about  patent  2.  The  formation  of  a pool  then  increases  the 
scope  for price  discrimination.  While  under  separate  licensing  all  users 
pay  the  same  price  for  the  license  of  a patent,  a pool  offers  a menu  of 
choices  either  by  itself  or  by marketing  the bundle  and  letting  members 
issue  individual  licenses.  Put  differently,  a  pool  creates  scope  for 
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have  a  favorable  or  detrimental  impact  on welfare.  It  is,  therefore,  not 
surprising  that  one  can  find  instances  in  which  a pool  (even  with  IL) re 
duces  ex  post  welfare. 
Consider,  second,  the  case  of  two-sided  markets.  For  example,  a  soft 
ware  compression  technology  must  be  licensed  to both  hardware  man 
ufacturers  and music  publishers  in order  to  find  a  market.  Suppose  that 
the  formation  of  a pool  lowers  the price  on  side A.  From  the  "seesaw"  or 
"topsy-turvy"  principle  for  two-sided  markets  (Rochet  and  Tir?le  2003; 
Weyl  2006),  a decrease  in price  on  side  A makes  it  less  attractive  for  the 
technological  platform  to bring  on  board  side  B  and  leads  to a price  in 
crease  on  side  B.  It  is  then  possible  (although  unlikely)  that  a pool  re 
duces  ex  post  welfare. 
Finally,  our  analysis  so  far has  presumed  that  independent  licensors 
of  substitutes  would  engage  in  cutthroat  competition;  this  obviously 
need  not  be  the  case;  on  the  other  hand,  they may  also  tacitly  collude  un 
der  separate  licensing  (no pool).  The  paper  compares  the  scope  for  tacit 
collusion  under  no  pool  and  a pool  with  IL. 
Overall,  while  the  conclusion  that  independent  licensing  always 
screens  in good  pools  and  screens  out  bad  ones  must  be  qualified,  the 
case  in  favor  of  pools  with  independent  licensing  remains  quite  strong, 
even  from  an  ex post  perspective,  in our  current  state  of  knowledge. 
V.  Grant-Backs 
Pools  may  or may  not  require  grant-backs.  Grant-back  provisions  force 
members  of  the  pool  to  turn  to  the  pool  for  free  or  at  a  low  price  future 
patents  that will  be  deemed  essential  to  the working  of  the  pool.  Typi 
cally,  the  determination  of whether  a patent  is essential  is  left  to an  out 
side  lawyer,  who  undertakes  the  painstaking  process  of  reviewing  the 
detailed  claims  of  each  patent.  Besides  the  issues  raised  by  the  vague 
ness  of  the  essentiality  requirement,  the  decision  of whether  to  include 
a grant-back  provision  is a  complex  one  from  both  a private  and  social 
perspective. 
For  the members  of  the pool,  grant-backs  have  costs  and  benefits: 
On  the  cost  side,  the  provision  obviously  discourages  future  innova 
tion  by  pool  members.  Innovations  that would  improve  the pool's  offer 
ing  and  raise  the overall  demand  for  the  technology  may  never  material 
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and  development  (R&D)  and  either  license  their  patents  to  the  pool  or 
the  users  at  a hefty  fee  or  concur  to  the  development  of  an  alternative 
technology.  One  would,  therefore,  expect  grant-backs  to be more  com 
mon  when  there  is  limited  scope  for  future  innovation. 
On  the  benefit  side,  grant-backs  provide  a  check  on members'  oppor 
tunism.  For  example,  a member  may  have  a patent  or  an  innovation  in 
the  pipeline,  which  he,  but  not  the  other  members,  knows  is  indispen 
sable  for  a proper  working  of  the  technology.  This  member  may  refrain 
from  disclosing  this  information  and  later  attempt  a holdup  on  the pool 
or  its  customers.  To  be  certain,  such  a  holdup  won't  arise  if  it  can  be 
proved  that  the member  deliberately  concealed  this  information;  it  is, 
however,  rather  difficult  to bring  evidence  to  this  respect. 
Whether  the members  of  the pool  have  an  incentive  to opt  for a grant 
back  requirement  depends  on  several  factors.  Obviously,  higher  uncer 
tainty  about  the patents  that  are  necessary  for  the  implementation  of  the 
technology  make  the holdup  concern  more  acute  and  grant-backs  more 
likely.  Another  factor,  studied  in Lerner,  Strojwas,  and  Tir?le  (2007),  is 
the  extent  of  complementarity  among  pool  patents.  Suppose  that 
patents  A  and  B,  owned  by  two  different  owners,  are  substitutes  and 
that  IL is not  demanded  by  antitrust  authorities  (this was  indeed  the  case 
for most  historical  pools).  Implementation  of  the  technology  may  or 
may  not  require  a  license  to an  "unknown"  third  and  blocking  patent  C. 
If the  owner  of A  also  owns  C,  and  the  owner  of  B  is unaware  of  the  ex 
istence  of C,  then  the  former  has  no  incentive  to  join  a pool.  The  combi 
nation  of  the  competitive  patent  and  the blocking  one  gives  him  full mo 
nopoly  power;  by  contrast,  by  joining  the pool,  he  has  to share  royalties 
with  his  rival  as  he  no  longer  has  access  to patent  A  (recall  that  IL  was 
not  allowed  so  as  to  suppress  competition).  Thus,  holdup  concerns  are 
less  important  for pools  of  substitutes,  and we  would  expect  grant-backs 
to be more  common  in pools  of  complements. 
A  social  planner  faces  some  of  the  same  trade-offs  with  regard  to grant 
backs.  The  social  planner  does  not want  concerns  about  potential  holdups 
to hamper  the  formation  of  a socially  beneficial  pool  and,  therefore,  can 
not  enunciate  a  per  se  rule  against  grant-backs.  For  a  social  planner, 
though,  grant-backs  raise  an  additional  concern:  a  grant-back  policy 
might  be  a device  to restrict  competition  in  the  innovation  market.  This 
concern  seems  more  potent  when  the  pool  includes  all  or most  players 
in the  relevant  innovation  market  and when  essentiality  is likely  to be  in 
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VI.  Patent  Pools:  The  Evidence 
It is natural  to ask whether  these  claims  about  patent  pools  are borne  out 
when  we  examine  the  actual  pools  that  have  been  formed. 
Lerner,  Strojwas,  and  Tir?le  (2007)  test  these  ideas  using  a  sample  of 
sixty-three  patent  pools  established  between  1895  and  2001.  As  discussed 
in  the  preceding,  we  expect  that  pools  with  independent  licensing  are 
more  likely  to be  formed  when  patents  are  complementary.  We  also  ex 
amine  the utilization  of  grant-back  provisions.  We  anticipate  that  pools 
of  complementary  patents  are more  likely  to have  these  provisions. 
In order  to undertake  this  analysis,  we  must  first  define  what  consti 
tutes  a patent  pool.  We  define  these  as  cases  where  either  (1) two  or more 
firms  combine  to  license  patents  to third  parties,  or  (2) three  or  more  firms 
come  together  to  license  patents  to  share  the patents  among  themselves, 
or both.  This  definition  excludes  several  other  types  of  arrangements: 
Simple  cross-license  arrangements  between  two  firms,  where  there  is 
no  clearly  stated  intention  of  engaging  in  future  licensing  transactions 
New  operating  companies  that  are  established  to manufacture  prod 
ucts  based  on  intellectual  property  of  a number  of  firms 
Firms  that  acquire  large  amounts  of  patents  and  then  license  them  to 
other  concerns 
Pools  that  are  dominated  by  nonprofit  entities  (e.g.,  universities), 
where  profit-maximizing  considerations  may  not  be  paramount 
We  then  compiled  a  list  of  all  identifiable  patent  pools,  using  a wide 
variety  of  historical  sources.  In  total,  we  identified  approximately  125 
patent  pools,  dating  between  1856  and  2001. We  succeeded  in obtaining 
the  pooling  agreements  for  63  of  these  pools,  relying  on  Congressional 
hearings  during  the  1930s  and  1940s  that  scrutinized  a number  of patent 
pools,  the  records  of private  or  federal  antitrust  litigation,  the files  of  the 
Antitrust  Division  of U.S.  Department  of  Justice  and  the U.S.  Federal 
Trade  Commission,  and  (in  the  case  of  recent  pools)  direct  contacts  with 
the pools  themselves. 
In the preceding  theoretical  discussion,  we  distinguish  between  pools 
consisting  of  patents  that  are  substitutes  or  complements,  that  is, be 
tween  pools  where  the motivation  is  to avoid  Bertrand  competition  be 
tween  licensees  and  those  where  the  goal  is  to avoid  the  familiar  prob 
lem  of  each  party  demanding  too high  a  licensing  rate. Of  course,  pools 
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mentary  or  substitute  patents.  Thus,  we  must  employ  proxies  based  on 
any  litigation  concerning  the pool  to  identify  such  awards. 
Over  the  entire  period  under  study,  pools  have  been  challenged  by 
private  parties  for  being  anticompetitive.  For  almost  the  entire  time 
span,  the  federal  government  has  intervened  in challenging  pools  it be 
lieves  to be  anticompetitive.  Thus,  the  extent  and  outcomes  of  the  litiga 
tion  involving  the pool  may  be  a  reasonable  indication  of  the  intentions 
of  the pool  founders.  This  is,  to be  sure,  an  imperfect  proxy.  A  variety  of 
criteria  weighted  into  the  assessment  of patent  pools  in  the pre-1995  era, 
which  only  imperfectly  map  into modern  economic  criteria  for assessing 
patent  pools. 
We  anticipate  that pools  that were  formed  with  substitute  patents  and 
the  goal  of  dampening  competition  between  licensees  were  more  likely 
to be  litigated.  We  seek  to  identify  any  litigation  involving  the pool  and 
its outcome,  relying  upon  the  sources  noted  in  the  preceding,  and  the 
media  and  historical  accounts  of  any  litigation  involving  these  pools. 
Our  empirical  work  corroborates  the  theory  in  two  important  ways: 
We  find  in each  case  that  pools  that were  more  likely  to have  comple 
mentary  patents?that  is, pools  that were  not  litigated  or  fared  better  in 
litigation?were  more  likely  to  allow  members  to  engage  in  indepen 
dent  licensing.  These  differences  are  often  statistically  significant.  This 
pattern  holds  both  in cross-tabulations  and  regression  analyses. 
Turning  to  the use  of  grant-back  provisions,  which  require  firms  to  li 
cense  related  IP to  the pool,  we  find  that pools  that were  not  litigated  are 
much  more  likely  to  require  grant-backs.  This  difference  is  statistically 
significant  at  the  5 percent  confidence  level. When  no  remedy  involving 
mandatory  third-party  licensing  was  imposed,  there  is  a  somewhat 
greater  probability  that  grant-backs  were  used.  Finally,  we  show  that 
grant-backs  are more  positively  associated  with  IL  when  the pool  is not 
litigated  or  is  subject  to  less  strict  remedies  regarding  licensing.  These 
results  are  consistent  with  theoretical  suggestions. 
VII.  Who  Joins  Pools? 
Theoretical  Considerations 
Antitrust  hostility  has  been  the  dominant  force  behind  the minor  role 
played  by  pools  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century.  But  it is not 
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about  the  effects  of  royalty  stacking,  we  should  not  expect  pools  to quite 
regain  their  earlier  prominence,  if only  because  of  the new  regulatory  re 
quirements  concerning  pool  charters.  We  now  offer  some  tentative  con 
jectures  as  to why  pools  may  not  form  and  why,  if  they  form,  they may 
not  be  as  inclusive  as would  be  desirable. 
Factors  Hindering  Pool  Formation.  There  are  several  factors  that 
make  the  formation  of  pools  challenging: 
Negotiation  costs.  Forming  a pool,  as  part  of  or  separately  from  the 
setting  of  a  standard,  involves  a protracted  process,  with  substantial  le 
gal  expenditures.  The  benefits  of  forming  a pool  have  to be  compared 
with  the  resulting  costs. 
Asymmetric  information.  The  theoretically  best-developed  cause  of 
bargaining  breakdown  relates  to  asymmetries  in  information  (AI)  be 
tween  prospective  members.  The  process  of  negotiating  to  form  a pool 
is  fraught  with  AI: 
AI  about  the value  of  individual  patents 
AI  about  design-around  costs 
AI  about  future  upstream  research  strategies 
AI  about  downstream  ambitions  (when  patentees  are  also  licensees) 
"Self-imposed  or  fairness  constraints/'  In  situations  in which  mem 
bers  have  patents  of  different  importance  and  different  design-around 
costs,  have  different  upstream  or  downstream  ambitions,  and  so  forth, 
efficient  bargaining  requires  that  charters  have  sufficient  flexibility  to 
tailor  conditions  (royalties,  grant-back  requirement,  etc.)  to  individual 
needs  and  bargaining  powers.  Yet  a  surprising  number  of  pools  go  for 
an  equal  treatment  for  all members.  In particular,  patents  are  counted, 
and  royalties  per  patent  are  equal  to  1/ft  of  pool  revenues.  Such  a pro 
vision  makes  sense  in  the Cournot  perfect  complements  case,  at  least  if 
patents  are  truly  blocking  (no  redesign-around  possibility),  but  not  in 
general.16 
Fairness  constraints,  while  they  reduce  the  scope  of  feasible  agree 
ments  and  reduce  negotiation  costs,  obviously  discourage  owners  of  im 
portant  patents  from  joining  the pool. 
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tion  VIII,  relates  to  the  different  interests  that  patentees  have  in  the 
downstream  market.  Pure  inventors  (who  have  no  downstream  pres 
ence)  aim  at maximizing  royalty  income.  By  contrast,  patentees  with  a 
substantial  downstream  presence  want  low  royalties,  perhaps  a royalty 
free  arrangement;  they  further  have  the  possibility  to  engage  in  cross 
licensing  if a pool  fails  to  form.  To  be  certain,  bargaining  over  royalties 
and  transfers  between  the  IP owners  in principle  could  overcome  this di 
vergence  in objectives.  But  information  gaps,  constraints  that  insure  that 
all  parties  will  be  treated  uniformly,  or  other  reasons  may  prevent  such 
deals.  Breakdowns  of negotiation  would  seem  more  likely  (at least  under 
uniform  treatment  constraints)  for pools  with  such  conflicting  interests. 
Factors  Facilitating  the  Emergence  of  a Pool.  There  are  other  consid 
erations,  though,  that  facilitate  pool  formation: 
Gains  from  trade.  The members'  gains  from  forming  a pool  may  come 
from  the  elimination  of  royalty  stacking  (complements)  or  the  suppres 
sion  of  competition  (substitutes).  With  the  advent  of  the  IL  require 
ment,  one  would  expect  pools  of  complements  to be  relatively  more 
likely  to  form. 
One-stop  shopping.  We  so  far  ignored  the  fact  that pools  economize  on 
users'  transaction  costs  by  offering  them  a  single  license  to  the  technol 
ogy.  A  more  difficult  question  is  to  identify  factors  that make  one-stop 
shopping  especially  attractive.  The  number  of  licensors  is  an  obvious 
guess,  although  an  increase  in  the number  of  licensors  may  also make  it 
harder  to negotiate  a patent  pool  arrangement. 
User  investment  and  standards.  Eliminating  royalty  stacking  is par 
ticularly  important  before  users  choose  to  invest  in  the  technology 
because  user  demand  is  more  elastic  ex  ante  than  ex post.  Hence,  distor 
tions  induced  by  royalty  stacking  are more  severe  from  an  ex  ante  per 
spective.  The  gain  from  forming  a pool  is  thus  higher  when  combined 
with  a standard  that will  induce  users  to sink  specific  investments  in  the 
technology:  see  appendix  C. 
Evidence  about  Who  Joins  Pools 
Much  of  the  economic  analysis  of  patent  pools  has  focused  on  their  role 
in  competition  policy.  As  such,  the  theoretical  literature  has  typically Public  Policy  toward  Patent  Pools  173 
assumed  or  generated  models  with  the  result  that  all  eligible  firms 
wish  to  join  the pool  (the  one  exception  is  Aoki  and Nagaoka  2004).  The 
literature  has  also  often  assumed  that  the  distribution  of  pool  earnings 
among  members  is flexible  enough  to entice  firms with  attractive  patents 
to  join  the pools  (Lerner  and  Tir?le  [2004]  look  at  the  impact  of  a variety 
of  distributions). 
Layne-Farrar  and  Lerner  (2007)  extend  the  empirical  branch  of  the  lit 
erature  by  examining  the determinants  of  joining  a patent  pool,  also  pro 
viding  some  preliminary  thoughts  on  the  rules  that  patent  pools  select 
for dividing  royalty  earnings  among  participants.  Using  the  theoretical 
literature  as  a  starting  point,  they  develop  several  hypotheses. 
First,  they  hypothesize  that while  all kinds  of firms  can  have  solid  rea 
sons  to  join  a patent  pool?including  concerns  over  aggregate  royalty 
rates  and  technology  adoption?firms  that  conduct  R&D  and participate 
in  the  downstream  market  for  the  final  good  or  service  are  relatively 
more  likely  join  a patent  pool.  These  vertically  integrated  firms  have 
more  than  one  point  along  the  production  chain  at which  to  earn  their 
profits  (from  patent  royalties  to  final  product  sales).  More  importantly, 
these  firms  are  both  licensors  and  licensees  as  they must  obtain  cross 
licenses  from  other  pool  members  in order  to produce  their  final  good. 
Both  of  these  factors  make  them  more  receptive  to pool  participation. 
Relatedly,  they  suggest  that  firms  may  choose  to participate  in patent 
pools  for products  related  to but  not  directly  involving  their  core  prod 
ucts  in order  to enhance  the  sale  of  their  core  products.  This  strategic  use 
of  patent  pools  lends  itself  to  royalty-free  licensing.  These  firms  might 
view  participation  in a  standard's  development  and  subsequent  partic 
ipation  in a related  pool  as  a business  expense  necessary  for  maintaining 
profit  levels  in key  products  and  services.  They  are willing  to exchange 
licensing  revenue  on  tangential  patents  for  the broader  technology  dis 
semination  that  patent  pools  can  spur. 
They  also  suggest  that  firms  with  relatively  symmetric  offerings  to a 
new  technology  are more  likely  to  form  a patent  pool  and may  be more 
likely  to agree  to proportional  sharing  rules.  For  instance,  if  two  firms 
have  both  made  one  crucial  contribution  to an  emerging  technology,  of 
rough  equivalence  in  importance  to  that  technology,  then  these  two 
firms  should  be  willing  to pool  their  patents  for  licensing  and  accept 
equal  shares  of  any  patent  pool  earnings. 
Finally,  if  the  value  of  a  firm's  contributions  to  a  new  technology 
roughly  corresponds  to  the  number  of  patents  that  the  company  con 
tributed,  that  firm  is  more  likely  to accept  a proportional  sharing  rule.  In 174  Lerner  and Tir?le 
this  case,  firms  joining  the  patent  pool  need  not  forego  equity  and  effi 
ciency  in  the name  of  lower  transaction  costs,  so proportionality  is  more 
attractive.  Of  course,  determining  the  value  of  a patent's  contribution 
can  be  extremely  difficult.  But  because  modern  patent  pools  tend  to 
grow  out  of  standards,  and  standards  can  take  years  of  active  debate  to 
define  and  formalize,  the potential  members  of  a patent  pool  are  likely 
to  be  quite  familiar  with  the  technologies  involved  and  the  various 
members'  contributions. 
The  authors  then  test  against  a data  set  of  firms  that have  either  joined 
or  are  eligible  to  join  a patent  pool,  focusing  on  the more  recent  pools. 
Looking  across  the  population  of  firms  that  have  relevant  patents  and 
participate  in a  standardization  effort  that  forms  the  basis  for  a patent 
pool,  they  find  a number  of  factors  that  increase  the  odds  of  joining  a 
pool.  Most  prominent  among  these  are vertical  integration  (whether  the 
firm manufactures  a core  product  dependent  on  the  standard),  the num 
ber  of  patents  a  firm  holds  within  a  standard,  and  the  symmetry  be 
tween  the  quality  of  a firm's  patent  portfolio  and  the  standard's  overall 
patent  contributions.  Pools  with  larger  founding  member  groups  tend 
to have  fewer  joiners. 
They  also  provide  some  preliminary  thoughts  on  the  roles  that patent 
pools  select  for dividing  royalty  earnings  among  participants.  While  the 
authors  are unable  to analyze  these  questions  as  fully  as  they would  like, 
the  various  patent  citation  measures  all  suggest  that  firms  with  higher 
value  patent  portfolios  are  less  likely  to  join  a proportional  pool.  For 
those  pools  choosing  a  proportional  rule,  patent  value  measures  are 
higher  for  nonpool  members,  while  the  reverse  holds  for  value-based 
pools.  Finally,  in patent  pools,  oftentimes  the  size  of pool  members'  port 
folios  is highly  correlated  with  measures  of  the portfolios'  value. 
VIII.  A Mini  Case  Study:  MPEG-2 
To  gain  a  richer  understanding  of  the  forces  shaping  patent  pooling 
agreements,  we  undertook  a  case  study  of  the MPEG-2  patent  pool.17 
MPEG-2  is  a digital  video  compression  standard  used  in products  in 
cluding  DVDs  and  high  definition  television.  The  standard  was  devel 
oped  by  the  International  Organization  for Standardisation  (ISO) under 
the  leadership  of Leonardo  Chiariglione,  along  with  scientists  and  engi 
neers  from many  universities  and  corporations.  The  standard  setting  ef 
fort began  in July  1990,  and  the  final MPEG-2  standard  was  approved  in 
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intellectual  property  issues  became  a paramount  concern.  While  all par 
ticipants  in  the  standard  setting  process  signed  a  letter  of  assurance  of 
fair,  reasonable,  and  nondiscriminatory  (RAND)  licensing,  concerns 
lingered  due  to  the  large  number  of  patents  required  to  implement  the 
standard.  Even  if all  individual  patent  holders  licensed  their  patents  on 
reasonable  terms,  Chiariglione  and  other  participants  were  concerned 
that  the  sum  of  all  such  licenses  might  not  be  reasonable.18 
The  MPEG  Intellectual  Property  Rights  Working  Group  was  thus 
formed  in  1993  to develop  a unified  approach  to  MPEG-2  licensing.  As 
the  standard  materialized,  this  task was  led by  CableLabs,  an R&D  con 
sortium  for  the  cable  industry  formed  in  the  late  1980s  when  there was 
little  compatibility  among  cable  systems  in  the United  States.  CableLabs 
was  an  active  participant  in  the MPEG-2  standard  setting  process,  with 
the  goal  of making  sure  that  the  resulting  standard  was  consistent  with 
their  needs.  Baryn  Futa,  executive  vice  president  and  chief  operating  of 
ficer  (COO)  of CableLabs,  gained  the  trust  of participants  by  chairing  the 
MPEG  IP  working  group.  Solutions  other  than  a patent  pool  were  con 
sidered,  such  as  a  trade  association  that would  function  as  a  clearing 
house.  But  patent  holders  wanted  to  ensure  that  their  IP  would  be  ag 
gressively  marketed  and  thus  rejected  such  an  association.  As  a  result, 
CableLabs  and  other  licensors  injected  $3 million  to  found  a  corpora 
tion, MPEG  LA, which  handled  licensing  MPEG-2  patents. 
Forming  the MPEG-2  patent  pool  and  convincing  companies  to  join 
the  pool  was  complicated  due  to  the  different  incentives  among  pool 
members.  These  heterogeneous  incentives,  as well  as  antitrust  consider 
ations,  shaped  the  critical  features  of  the  pool. 
The  most  debated  issue  was  the  licensing  rate  that MPEG  LA would 
charge  licensees.  The  primary  motive  for  certain  companies  was  not  to 
maximize  licensing  revenues,  but  rather  to  accelerate  the  adoption  of 
the  standard.  For  instance,  while  Sony  is both  a  licensor  and  licensee  of 
MPEG-2  patents,  Sony  focuses  on  maximizing  sales  of  its  electronics 
products  and  pursues  patents  as  a  "defensive  mechanism"  to protect 
its  IP. 
By way  of  contrast,  other  organizations  such  as Lucent  and  Columbia 
University  wanted  to maximize  the  licensing  revenues  they  received 
from  their MPEG-2  patents.  Columbia  was  particularly  motivated  to 
see  the  pool  succeed  due  to  its  fears  that  if a pool  were  not  formed, 
then MPEG-2  patents  would  largely  be  shared  via  royalty-free  cross 
licensing  agreements.  Because  the university  did  not  stand  to gain  by  be 
ing  offered  a  license  to  another  firm's  technology,  in  the  absence  of  a 176  Lerner  and Tir?le 
pool,  Columbia  would  be  put  in  the unenviable  position  of  demanding 
license  payments  in  an  environment  where  no  other  cash  payments 
were  being  made  for MPEG-2  licenses.  While  it  might  be  thought  that 
such  a  condition  would  allow  them  to charge  higher,  rather  than  lower, 
royalties,  they  feared  that  in actuality,  their  flexibility  in  licensing  would 
be  sharply  reduced.  Thus,  Columbia's  ability  to demand  a  relatively 
high  royalty  rate was  balanced  by  its need  to  ensure  that  a patent  pool 
emerged. 
On  the  other  hand,  Lucent  took  a different  approach  to  the MPEG-2 
pool.  Lucent  had  a  large  internal  licensing  department  with  sufficient 
resources  to conduct  its own  MPEG-2  licensing  activities.  Moreover,  Lu 
cent  believed  that  two  of  its  patents  were  most  critical  to  the MPEG 
standard.  Lucent  felt  that  the  licensing  rate  established  by MPEG  LA 
was  lower  than  it could  have  been  and  decided  not  to  join  the pool.19  Lu 
cent  estimated  that  the higher  royalty  rates  it  would  be  able  to charge  by 
not  joining  the pool  would  more  than  offset  the decreased  fraction  of  the 
MPEG-2  market  that would  license  its  technology  if  it pursued  its own 
licensing  activities.20 
The  final  licensing  rate  set by  the pool  was  four  dollars  per  decoder  for 
each MPEG-2  system.  This  one-size-fits-all  strategy  led  to problems  in 
some  markets.  In  some  cases,  licensees  already  had  licenses  to  some  of 
the  MPEG-2  patents  based  on  broad  licensing  agreements  they  had  with 
MPEG  LA member  firms.  In  such  cases,  the  licensees  have  demanded 
that  the  rates  they  are  charged  be  reduced.  MPEG  LA  has  handled 
such  situations  by  telling  these  firms  to negotiate  concessions  with  the 
individual  firms  involved  in  the  previous  licensing  agreements  rather 
than  altering  the  standard  MPEG  LA  licensing  terms.  A  bigger  problem 
occurred  in  using  the  same  terms  for  firms  in  different  industries. 
Computer  companies  have  been  reluctant  to pay  these  rates,  due  to  the 
perceived  computer  industry  norm  of  not  paying  royalties  and  due  to 
the  number  of  features  embodied  in  computers  that  do  not  relate  to 
MPEG-2.  This  led  seven  MPEG  LA  pool  members  to  initiate  infringe 
ment  litigation  against  Compaq  and  Dell. 
Additional  clauses  in  the MPEG  LA  license  agreement  were  designed 
to  make  MPEG-2  licensees  comfortable  in adopting  the  technology.  The 
MPEG  LA  license  grants  licenses  under  the  future  MPEG-2  essential 
patents  of  pool  members  at  no  additional  charge.  This  provision  was 
viewed  as  a way  to allay  the  fears  of  potential  licensees  that  they would 
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faced.  The MPEG  LA  license  also  commits  to not  raising  the  royalty  rate 
unless  extreme  conditions  arise.  This  clause  is also  intended  to  make  po 
tential  licensees  comfortable  with  committing  to use  MPEG-2  in  their 
products  without  the worry  of being  charged  excessively  high  licensing 
rates  in  the  future.21 
The  commitment  not  to  raise  royalty  rates,  however,  also  impacts  the 
ability  of  the  pool  to  attract  new  licensors.  When  a new  licensor  enters 
the  pool,  as  any  essential  MPEG-2  patent  holder  may  do,  each  existing 
licensor  is diluted:  the  formula  used  by  the pool  for  royalty  distribution 
calls  for  each  licensor  to  receive  a pro  rata  share  of  the  licensing  rev 
enues  (based  on  the number  of  essential  patents  it owns),  while  the  rate 
charged  to  licensees  remains  constant.  This  formula  was  seen  as  the only 
feasible  formula  to  avoid  controversies  regarding  assigning  value  to 
each  individual  patent. 
The  pool  was  shaped  by  antitrust  concerns  as well.  Conversations 
with  the DOJ  made  clear  that  several  features  were  necessary.  These  in 
cluded  provisions  that  (1)  licensors  would  not  be  precluded  from  offer 
ing  licenses  under  their  individual  patents,  (2) pool  membership  would 
be  open  to any  firm with  essential  MPEG-2  patents,  and  (3) only  essen 
tial patents  (as determined  by  outside  counsel)  would  be  included. 
IX.  Final  Thoughts 
As  this  essay  shows,  there  are  still  a number  of  open  questions  about  the 
workings  and  the  desirable  features  of  patent  pools.  Nonetheless,  our 
understanding  of  pools  has  improved,  and  we  can  draw  a  few  policy 
conclusions  corresponding  to our  current  knowledge.  A  key  insight  of 
this  essay  relates  to  the  role  that  an  independent  licensing  provision 
plays  in  the  formation  and  performance  of  the pool. 
In a  lawyer's  language,  one might  consider  offering  a safe  harbor  from 
antitrust  scrutiny,  which  would  allow  pools  quite  generally  as  long  as 
they  (1)  serve  no  ancillary  purpose  (i.e.,  traditional  collusion  or market 
division)  and  (2)  allow  for  independent  licensing  of  the  individual 
patents  by  their  respective  owners.  This  essay's  analysis  suggests  that 
such  a policy  would  simultaneously  encourage  the  development  of  so 
cially  efficient  pools  (and  discourage  inefficient  ones),  while  reducing 
the  regulatory  uncertainty  surrounding  the  subjective  antitrust  treat 
ment  of  pools  (who  gets  to  decide  whether  patents  are  substitutes  or 
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are  interested  in designing  a policy  aimed  at  enhancing  traditional  as 
sessments  of  consumer  welfare  while  maintaining  the  incentives  to  in 
novate,  patent  pools  with  an  independent  licensing  allowance  are  likely 
to enhance  social  welfare,  from  a  theoretical  as well  as  empirical  or  his 
torical  perspective.  Consequently,  whereas  pools  with  these  provisions 
are  likely  to receive  light  scrutiny  and  pools  that  restrict  independent  li 
censing  are more  likely  to  receive  a higher  level  of  scrutiny,  we  would 
not  expect  such  a  simple  rule  to perfectly  capture  social  concerns  about 
patent  pools,  and  so pools  would  still  be  subjected  to  an  antitrust  scru 
tiny 
on  a  rule-of-reason  basis. 
Appendix  A 
An  Analytic  Framework 
Consider  a  set  I =  {1...,  n) of  n patents.  Let  / denote  an  arbitrary  subset 
and  P(J)  the  total  price  to be  paid  for acquiring  licenses  to  the patents  in 
cluded  in /. For  example,  if  the  licenses  are marketed  separately  at  indi 
vidual  prices  {p;}, 
then 
Alternatively,  the  licenses  can  be  sold  as bundles. 
Assume  that  users  differ  in  some  parameter  0  and  that  their  net  sur 
plus  is 
(1)  e + V(/)-P(J), 
where  V(J)  < V{J)  when  / 3  J'.22  The  V(-)  function  accommodates  a  large 
range  of  situations,  including  patents  of  unequal  importance  and  vary 
ing  degrees  of  complementarity  or  substitutability  from  perfect  substi 
tutes  to perfect  complements. 
User  heterogeneity  (captured  by  0, distributed  according  to  some  cu 
mulative  distribution  function  F(0))  can,  for  example,  stem  from  differ 
ences  in  the  technological  or  opportunity  cost  of  adopting  and  adapting 
to  the  technology  class  defined  by  the  set  of  patents. 
The  key  assumption  in  equation  (1)  is  that  of  separability  between 
user  type  and  incremental  gains  of  extra  patents. 
Assuming  separability  is simple:  Separability  implies  that  (1)  in  the  ab 
sence  of pool,  all  adopting  users  buy  the  same  bundle  (the one  that max Public  Policy  toward  Patent  Pools  179 
imizes V(J) 
- 
P(/));  (2) it is optimal  for the pool  to offer  the full set of 
patents  and  not  to  license  subsets.  Put  differently,  menus  are  suboptimal 
for  the  pool  as  they  cannot  be  used  to  capture  user  surplus. 
Assuming  separability  is  illuminating:  It allows  a  clean  separation  be 
tween  the  "demand  margin,"  which  generalizes  the  royalty-stacking 
argument  for  perfect  complements  (the  demand  margin  is binding  if 
an  individual  price  increase  reduces  the  demand  for  the  overall  bas 
ket  but  does  not  lead  to  the  exclusion  of  the  corresponding  license 
from  the  basket  selected  by  users),  and  the  "competitive  margin," 
which  generalizes  the  notion  of  competition  under  perfect  substitutes: 
The  competitive  margin  is binding  if an  individual  price  increase  im 
plies  the  eviction  of  the  corresponding  license  from  the basket  selected 
by 
users. 
Assuming  separability  is familiar  from  the  literature:  It  is  inspired  by  the 
nested-decisions  approach  in  the  discrete-choice  literature.  Here,  users 
first  select  the best  basket  for  the  technology  and  then  choose  whether  to 
adopt  the  technology  at all. The  heterogeneity  in 0 yields  the  elasticity  of 
the  overall  demand  for  the  technology 
Example  1:Design-Arounds 
Suppose  that  all  pieces  are  needed  to  implement  the  technology,  but  in 
dividual  patents  can  be  designed  around.  Let  C(K)  denote  the  cost  of  re 
designing  around  the  subset  of  patents  K.  This  function  can  be  sepa 
rable,  C(K)  = 
Z;eX c., where  cj  is  the  cost  of  designing  around  patent  ;; 
subadditive,  C(K)  +  C(L)  >  C(K  u  L),  that  is,  there  are  economies  of 
scope;  or  superadditive,  as when  the  company  has  scarce  engineering 
resources.  Then 
V(J) = C(I)-C(I-J). 
Example  2: Diagnostic  Testing 
Doctors  can  use  sets  of mutations  in order  to diagnose  an  illness  and  de 
cide whether  to undertake  a  treatment.  More  mutations  allow  for  a bet 
ter  diagnostic,  but  the  function  V(J)  can  have  various  properties  de 
pending  on  the  cross-correlations  of  errors  between  the  different  tests. 
The  net  benefit  of  treating  a  sick  patient  is B;  the  net  damage  of  treating 
a healthy  one  is D. 180  Lerner  and Tir?le 
V(m) 
->>  m 
too  little  confidence  to  act 
Figure  5A.1 
Value  function  for  symmetric,  independent  patents 
For  the  sake  of  illustration,  suppose  that  a  patient  is  ill with  prior 
probability  x and  that  a  treatment  is optimal  only  if the probability  of  ill 
ness  exceeds  p 
= D/(B  + D)  >  x. Tests  issue  false  positives,  but  no  false 
negatives.  Let  Y(/)  denote  the  probability  that  tests  in /  all  yield  a  false 
positive.  Then  the  posterior  probability  of  illness  after  only  positives  is 
x(J) 
= x/[x  +  (l-  x)Y(])].  The  value  function  is  then 




Figure  5A.1  illustrates  the  value  function  for  symmetric,  independent 
patents  (in which  case  it depends  only  on  the  number  of  licenses  held 
by  the  health  care  facility).  The  parameter  0  can  be  thought  of  as  being 
(minus)  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  equipment  or  of  training  the  doc 
tors  to  this  technology,  or  as  (minus)  the  value  under  alternative  forms 
of  testing. 
For  expositional  simplicity,  let us  focus  on  the  symmetric  patents  case; 
by  abuse  of notation,  we  then write  the value  function  as  a function  V(m) 
of  the number  m  <  n of  licenses  that  are  acquired  by  the user. 
A  pool  of  n  patents  unconstrained  by  independent  licensing  sells  at 
price  P*  that maximizes  patent  holders'  profit: 
PD[P-V(n)], 
where  the  demand  corresponds  to  the  fraction  of  users  who  adopt  the 
technology:  D[P 
- 
V(n)]  =  1-F[P-  V(n)l Public  Policy  toward  Patent  Pools  181 
In  the  absence  of a pool,  individual  licensors  may  be  constrained  by  the 
following: 
demand  margin:  They  then  charge  individual  license  price  p such  that 





resulting  in  total  price  P  >  P*  for  the  overall  technologies  (royalty 
stacking); 
competitive  margin:  Let  z(n)  denote  the  (unique)  solution  to 
(2)  V(n)  = 
np 





Z(ft)  = 
ftp. 
z(ft)  is the maximum  price  that  a patent  holder  can  charge  without  be 
ing  evicted  from  the  licensing  basket.  (Note  that  if one  license  is evicted, 
another  may  then  be  evicted  as well,  so m may  be  smaller  than  ft -  1  in 
the maximand  in  equation  [2]. For  example,  in  the  redesign-around  il 
lustration,  the  eviction  of  license  1  may  trigger  the  eviction  of  license  2  if 
there  are  returns  to  scope  in  redesigning  around  patents  1 and  2  to 
gether.)  The  magnitude  z(n)  (or Z(n))  is  the measure  of  the  complemen 
tarity  between  patents:  Figure  5A.2  summarizes  the  analysis. 
P 
p* 
Z(n) (Extent  of 
Competition  Demand  margin  complementarity) 
margin  binds  in  binds  in absence 
absence  of  pool.  of pool 
Total  pnce  of 
technology  P 
Figure  5A.2 
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Appendix  B 
Proof  That  Pools  with  IL Are,  from  a  Schumpeterian  Perspective, 
Preferable  to No  Pools 
To  avoid  discussing  bargaining  powers,  let us  consider  the  symmetric 
case  and  assume  that,  if a pool  forms,  each  patent  receives  \/n  of  the 
pool  royalties.  Let n^n)  and  P^n)  denote  the  inventors'  total  profit  and 
the  technology's  total  price  when  there  are  n patents/firms  and  a patent 
pool  (with  IL)  is allowed;  let U0(n)  and  P0(n)  denote  the  corresponding 
levels  when  no  pool  is allowed.  Clearly 
n^w) > Tl0(n)  and P,(n) < PQ(n)  for all n 
(the pool  ex post  always  weakly  increases  profit  and weakly  reduces  the 
technology's  price). 
At  the  ex  ante  stage,  (a  large  number  of)  firms  choose  whether  to  in 
novate.  Without  loss  of  generality,  let K{ denote  the  corresponding  in 
vestment  cost,  where  K{  is  (weakly)  increasing  in  i.  We  will  also  assume 
that  if there  are  several  free-entry  equilibria,  then  the one with  the  largest 
number  of  firms  prevails.  That  is,  for  k g  {0,1}, nk is  the  highest  number 
such  that  [Ilk(nk)]/nk 
> 
Knk  and  [Tlk(nk  +  l)]/(nk  +1)  < 
KHk+v 
This  implies  that 
n,>n0 
(intuitively,  higher  ex  post  profits  trigger  more  innovation  ex  ante). 
Revealed  preference  then  implies  that 
Vinj-P^nJZVinJ-P.in,) 
(since  the  pool,  for  any  n, maximizes  PD[P 
- 
V(ri)\  =  [P +  V(n)]D(P), 
where  P  = P-  V(n)  is  the net  price.  Revealed  preference  implies  that P  is 
decreasing  in n). And  so, because  a pool  with  IL always  lowers  the price 
V(nx)  -P,(nx)  >V(n0)-P0(n0). 
Thus,  users  are  always  made  better  off  than  in  the  absence  of pool. Public  Policy  toward  Patent  Pools  183 
Appendix  C 
User  Investment  and  Benefits  from  Forming  a Pool 
In  the  framework  defined  in  appendix  1,  suppose  that  there  are  two 
stages?ex  ante  and  ex 
post. 
The  optimal  pool  price  is 
^exan* 
= 
arg  rnax|PDexanJP 
- 






V(n)]}  ex post. 
Assuming  that  ex  post  demand  function  is  less  elastic  than  the  ex  ante 
one, 
P*  < P*  ex ante  ex post 
By  contrast,  the  competitive  margin,  and  therefore  Z(n),  are  the  same  ex 
ante  and  ex 
post. 
Suppose  that  pools  must  allow  for  independent  licensing.  Then  only 
pools  that  reduce  the  technology's  price  form.  And,  if 
*  ex ante <  -Aft)  <  / 
expost, 
there  is a benefit  for  the patentees  to  forming  a pool  ex  ante,  but  no  such 
benefit  ex  post. 
Endnotes 
Draft  prepared  for  the  2007  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research  (NBER)  Innovation 
Policy  and  the  Economy  Conference,  Washington,  DC,  April  12.  We  are  grateful  to Scott 
Stern  for  helpful  comments  on  an  earlier  draft. 
1.  Gallini  (2002)  and  Jaffe  and  Lerner  (2004)  review  this  literature. 
2.  For  example,  these  have  been  proposed  by Merges  (1999),  Priest  (1977),  Shapiro  (2001), 
and  the U.S.  Patent  and  Trademark  Office  (Clark  et  al.  2001). 
3.  See  Clarkson  (2003). 
4.  See,  for  instance,  Delmer  et  al.  (2003);  Ebersole,  Guthrie,  and  Goldstein  (2005);  Van 
Overwalle  et  al.  (2006);  and  Verbeure  et  al.  (2006). 
5.  In Bernent  v. National  Harrow  Co.  (186 U.S.  70  [1902]),  the U.S.  Supreme  Court,  ruling  on 
a patent  pool,  stated  that  "the  general  rule  is absolute  freedom  in  the  use  or  sale  of  rights 
under  the  patent  laws."  In  Hartford  Empire  v. U.S.  (323 U.S.  386  [1945]),  U.S.  Supreme  Court 
Justice  Black,  also  referring  to a patent  pool,  stated  that  "the  history  of  this  country  has  per 
haps  never  witnessed  a more  completely  successful  economic  tyranny." 184  Lerner  and Tir?le 
6.  See  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm. 
7.  See  http:/  /www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/200455.htm. 
8.  See  the Commission's  guidelines  on  the  application  of Article  81  of  the  European  Com 
mission  Treaty  to  technology  transfer  agreements  (2004/C  101/02),  April  27,  2004.  Simi 
larly,  in 1216  of  its guidelines  on  the  application  of Article  81  of  the  European  Commission 
Treaty  to  technology  transfer  agreements  (2004/C  101/02),  April  27,  2004,  the  European 
Commission  states  that  "A  technology  is essential  as  opposed  to non-essential  if  there  are 
no  substitutes  for  that  technology  inside  or  outside  the  pool  and  the  technology  in ques 
tion  constitutes  a  necessary  part  of  the  package  of  technologies  for  the  purposes  of  pro 
ducing  the  product(s)  or  carrying  out  the  process(es)  to which  the  pool  relates." 
9.  The  U.S.  policies  are  codified  at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558 
.htm  (see  especially  section  5.5). 
10.  1235: 
"Finally,  it  is  relevant  to  take  account  of  the  dispute  resolution  mechanism  foreseen  in  the 
instruments  setting  up  the  pool.  The  more  dispute  resolution  is entrusted  to bodies  or  per 
sons  that  are  independent  of  the  pool  and  the member's  thereof,  the more  likely  it  is  that 
the  dispute  resolution  will  operate  in a neutral  way." 
11.  1222: 
"The  Commission  will  in  its overall  assessment,  inter  alia,  take  account  of  the  following  fac 
tors:  (c) whether,  in  cases  where  the  pooled  technologies  have  different  applications  some 
of which  do  not  require  use  of  all  of  the  pooled  technologies,  the  pool  offers  the  technol 
ogies  only  as  a  single  package  or whether  it offers  separate  packages  for  distinct  appli 
cations.  In  the  latter  case  it  is avoided  that  technologies  which  are  not  essential  to  a par 
ticular  product  or  process  are  tied  to  essential  technologies;  (d) whether  the  pooled 
technologies  are  available  only  as  a  single  package  or whether  licensees  have  the  possibil 
ity  of  obtaining  a  license  for  only  part  of  the  package  with  a  corresponding  reduction  of 
royalties.  The  possibility  to  obtain  a  license  for  only  part  of  the  package  may  reduce  the 
risk  of  foreclosure  of  third  party  technologies  outside  the  pool,  in particular  where  the  li 
censee  obtains  a  corresponding  reduction  in  royalties.  This  requires  that  a  share  of  the 
overall  royalty  has  been  assigned  to  each  technology  in  the  pool...." 
12.  Implicitly,  we  assume  that  this  contribution  is  independent  of  the  user's  demand  for 
the  technology;  that  is, we  make  a  separability  assumption:  see  appendix  A  for  a descrip 
tion  of  the  framework. 
13. With  more  than  two  patent  owners,  any  price  that  exceeds  the  price  that would  pre 
vail  in  the  absence  of  a pool  is  weakly  unstable,  in  that  if the pool  attempted  to  charge  such 
a price  for  the  technology,  there  would  exist  an  equilibrium  in  which  independent  licenses 
are  sold  at  the  no-pool  prices,  and  the  pool  does  not  sell. 
14.  In  our  discussion  of  dynamic  incentives,  we  abstract  from  the  strategic  aspects  of 
patent  races  under  the  prospect  of  pool  formation.  How  these  prospects  affect  the  inten 
sity  of  competition  in  the R&D  market  is analyzed  in Dequiedt  and  Versaevel  (2006). 
15.  This  terminology  is  inspired  by  Rasmussen's  (1988)  "entry  for  buyout." 
16.  This  holds  when  each  member  contributes  one  patent  to  the pool.  More  generally,  with 
m members,  the Cournot  model  and,  say,  the Nash  bargaining  solution  predict  that  each 
member  gets  1/m  of  the  royalties  (having  one  or more  blocking  patents  makes  no  differ 
ence  if  they  are  truly  blocking). Public  Policy  toward  Patent  Pools  185 
17.  This  section  is based  on  interviews  with  current  and  former  employees  from  five  dif 
ferent  organizations  that  participated  in or  negotiated  with  the  pool.  In addition,  we  spoke 
with  Leonardo  Chiariglione,  the vice  president  of Multimedia  at Telecom  Italia  Lab,  the  re 
search  center  of  Telecom  Italia.  Finally,  we  spoke  with  a  representative  from MPEG  LA,  the 
corporate  entity  formed  to  administrate  the  pool. 
18.  It should  be  noted  that  considerable  ambiguity  surrounds  the  definition  of what  con 
stitutes  RAND  licensing.  A  number  of  standard-setting  bodies  we  talked  to were  unable 
to provide  a precise  definition  of what  constituted  a  reasonable  royalty.  For  instance,  one 
group  indicated  that  they  used  5 percent  as  an  upper  bound,  but  did  not  distinguish  be 
tween  cases  where  the  rate  applied  to  the  individual  component  and  the  entire  system. 
19.  Lucent  was  also  constrained  by  licensing  policies  that  were  established  as  part  of  a 
1956  consent  decree  settling  federal  antitrust  litigation  against  Western  Electric. 
20.  So  far,  this  has  not  been  the  case,  as MPEG-2  licensees  generally  have  been  willing  to 
pay  Lucent  no  more  than  the  per-patent  rate  charged  by MPEG  LA  for  licenses  under  Lu 
cent's  MPEG-2  patents.  The  failure  of  Lucent  to  reap  attractive  returns  from  its  holdout 
strategy  may  appear  initially  puzzling.  The  seller  of  a complementary  good  should  be  able 
to  charge  more  when  other  firms  cut  their  prices.  Industry  observers,  however,  argued 
that  substantial  uncertainty  surrounded  the  determination  of  the  proper  royalty  rate  for 
patents.  MPEG  LA's  decision  to  set  a  low  rate may  have  been  seen  as  a  signal  of  the  patents' 
value,  leading  to  a  reduced  willingness  to  license  Lucent's  complementary  patents  at  a 
high  rate. 
21.  In point  of  fact,  the  royalty  rate  has  subsequently  been  lowered  to  $2.50,  even  as  the 
number  of  patent  families  covered  by  the  pool  has  expanded  from  25  to  118. 
22.  This  formulation  allows  for  the  possibility  of  user  downstream  competition:  see 
Lerner  and  Tir?le  (2004)  paper  for more  details. 
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